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-IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
DOUGLAS J. DAVIS,
Plnintiff-Appellant,

I

vs.
"\Y.

Case No.
11931

Defendant-Respondent ..\
RESPOXDEXT'S BRIEF
STATEl.IEXT OF THE XATURE OF THE CASE

This is an action inYohing a \\Titten option
agreement for the purchase of real property, wherein the plaintiff-appellant seeks relief against the
defendant-respondent on two counts: ( 1) damages
for alleged fraud and ( 2) rescission of the agreement.
DISPOSITIO:\ IX LO"\YER COL"RT

Judgment of ":\o Cause of Action" was entered
on October 27, 1969. Thereafter plaintiff's motion to
amend Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Judgment \\as denied.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks affirmance of the judgment
of the trial court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant's statement of facts is inconsistent
with the facts of this case in that appellant would
have this court believe that respondent misinformed
the appellant as to the location of respondent's property. This respondent denies and makes his own
statement of facts.
Thomas W. Mulholland, respondent herein, was
73 years of age at the time of the trial. He has lived
in the area near where the property in question is
located for approximately 60 years. He is thoroughly familiar with the property having herded sheep
thereon as a boy and having participated in the making of two surveys thereof and having located monuments thereon. ( R 127, 132, 138, 139).
The Mulholland property which is in question
here is an 80 acre tract in the Mt. Olympus area of
Salt Lake County which is legally described in the
option. (Exhibit P-1).
On or about September 22, 1965, respondent
granted to appellant and J. Keith Hansen an option
to purchase the property (Exhibit P-1). A few weeks
prior thereto appellant and Hansen came to respond-
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ent's home for the purpose of negotiating with respondent for the purchase of an interest in his property. Respondent had not listed the property for sale
with a real tor nor did he solicit Hansen and appellant
in the deal (R 62, 140, 141). The purchase price for
the property as well as the price for the option were
fixed by appellant and Hansen (R 141). Respondent
voluntarily cut the price of the option in half from
$10,000.00 to $5,000.00 (R 148). Respondent furnished the legal description to appellant and Hansen
and they had the agreement prepared ( R 43).
Prior to the execution of the option respondent
showed appellant and Hansen where the property is
located. Its general location can be seen from respondent's backyard. Respondent pointed the property out, generally, to appellant and Hansen from
his backyard. He showed it to them on the plat
(R 141, 142). He took them up on the property
(R 142, 143, 144). He also showed it to them from
a road which is to the west thereof ( R 144, 145, 146,
147). A monument (Exhibit P-12) locates the northwest corner of Section 12 which is also the northwest
corner of the Mulholland property ( R 133). While
appellant, Hansen and respondent were up on the
property respondent pointed out to appellant and
Hansen the location of said monument and told them
it was the northwest corner of the property (R 144,
146). He pointed out the monument while they were
on a street below the property by indicating that it
was east of a certain house near where they were
standing (R 146). The south boundary of the prop-
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erty adjoins state land. The southwest corner of the
property is located in a gully or ravine called Pine
Hollow. While up on the property respondent pointed
out to appellant and Hansen the location of the southwest corner in Pine Hollow ( R 145) . When they were
on a dirt road west of the property in the vicinity of
a gate at the line of the state land respondent also
pointed out to appellant and Hansen the location of
the southwest corner of the property in Pine Hollow
(R 146).
There are two water tanks on the hillside which
are referred to by most of the witnesses as a landmark with respect to the property. Exhibit D-15 is a
plat of Section 1 and Exhibit D-16 is a plat of Section 12. These sections are adjacent to each other.
Section 12 is on the south. The water tanks are in the
northeast corner of the southwest quarter of the
southwest quarter of Section 1 and the Mulholland
property is in Section 12, the north boundary of
which is approximately 1300 feet south of the water
tanks ( R 130, 131 ) .
Respondent denies having told anyone that his
property is within 200 to 300 feet south of the water
tanks. On the contrary, he stated that his property
lies about a quarter of a mile south of the water tanks
(R148,149).
Appellant had an appraisal of the property made
by E. H. Throndsen. His appraisal report is Exhibit
D-3. Mr. Throndsen claimed respondent told him the
property was 200 to 300 feet south of the water
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tanks. This respondent denies ( R 149). The property
is properly described in the appraisal report. It is
property shown in the map attached thereto designated as Exhibit A and the contour maps shown
therein correspond with the topographical maps prepared by the United States Department of the Interior (R 112, 113).
Mr. Hansen acquired the option for investment
purposes only ( R 78). He took the Throndsen appraisal to a lVIr. Harmon for the purpose of interesting him in purchasing the property. Without going
on the property, Mr. Harmon said, "There wasn't
the kind of property up there valued at that amount."
( R 78). Upon learning from Mr. Hansen that there
was a problem (R 52), appellant went to the home of
respondent on a Sunday morning. He was excited and
talked loud. To avoid disturbing the neighbors, respondent asked appellant to leave ( R 152).
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE FINDING OF THE TRIAL COURT
THAT RESPONDENT DID NOT MISREPRESENT THE LOCATION OF THE PROPERTY IS
SUPPORTED BY THE WEIGHT OF THE
EVIDENCE.
The trial court found that respondent "did not
intentionally or mistakenly represent" to appellant
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or J. Keith Hansen that the property he owned was
located other than as described in the option agreement, and that respondent did not induce appellant
or J. Keith Hansen or either of them "to enter into
said option agreement by making any false misrepresentation to them or otherwise" ( R 21).
In a law case the review of the appellate court
of findings of the trial court is limited to the determination of whether or not there is competent evidence to support them. Dahnken v. George Romney
& Sons Co., 184 P. 2d211, 111Utah471.
In an equity case the appellate court can review
the findings of the trial court but they will not be
set aside "unless it manifestly appears that the court
has misapplied proven facts or made findings clearly
against the weight of the evidence." Huber vs. Newman, 106 Utah 363, 145 P. 2d, 780, 782. Other cases
to the same effect are Rubey v. Wood, 373 P. 2d 386,
13 Utah 2d 285, and Merrill v. Bailey & Sons Co.,
106 P. 2d 255, 99 Utah 323.
Respondent was not mistaken as to the location
of the property. He has been on the property over a
period of approximately 60 years, including herding
sheep, participating in two surveys and locating
monuments thereon.
The claim of misrepresentation is foreign to
the dealings of the parties. Respondent took no affirmative steps to sell his property to appellant. He
did not list it with a real estate broker. He did not
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seek out appellant and Hansen. On the contrary, they
came to him. It was they rather than he who set the
sale price and the price for the option. Respondent
voluntarily cut the price of the option in half. It was
they rather than he who prepared the option agreement. The property is correctly described in the option agreement. The legal description therefor was
supplied by respondent.
The weight of the evidence is that respondent
not only did not misrepresent the location of the
property but that he properly identified and showed
it to appellant and Hansen. Respondent showed the
location of the property to appellant and Hansen on
maps. He pointed out to appellant and Hansen from
his backyard the general location of the property. He
took appellant and Hansen up on the property and
pointed out to them the location of the corners thereof. He took them on a roadway to the west and below
the property and showed them the location of the
northwest and southwest corners thereof.
Exhibit D-12 is a picture of a monument at
the northwest corner of Section 12 which is also the
northwest corner of the Mulholland property (R
133). Exhibit D-8 is a picture of a house taken from
the vicinity of the monument shown in Exhibit D-12
(R 133). Exhibit D-10 is a picture of the house
shown in Exhibit D-8 taken from below and looking
up toward the monument in Exhibit D-12 (R 133).
Exhibit D-13 is a picture of a dirt road by a gate just
below the southwest corner of the Mulholland prop-
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erty. ( R 135, 136). Exhibit D-11 is a picture of a
ravine called Pine Hollow (R 136, 137). The gate is
a quarter of a mile south of the monument shmvn in
Exhibit D-12 ( R 136). The general location of the
southwest corner of the Mulholland property can be
seen in Exhibit D-11 (R 137).
While in his backyard and also \vhen up on the
property, respondent used maps similar to Exhibits
D-15 and D-16 and showed to appellant and Hansen
on the maps the location of his property, the location
of the water tanks, and that he was the record owner
of the -10 acre tract east of the wat€r tanks which
property he had sold to :Mr. Brockbank and that his
ground commenced one quarter of a mile south of the
water tanks ( R 141). He said they would haYe to
walk across Brockbank's 40 acres to get to his ( 1Iulholland's) property (R 141, 142). He told them they
would haYe to go up a steep ridge which was south
of the water tanks and that the north line of his 80
acres was on top of the ridge ( R 143) . \Yhen they
got on top of the ridge, respondent pointed out the
south\vest corner of his property which could not be
seen from below but could be seen from the top. (R
143). "\Yhile on top of the property, respondent
pointed out the southwest corner but indicated it was
almost in the bottom of Pine Hollow ( R 14-1) .\Yhile
up on the property and at a place where the houses
below could be seen, respondent pointed out to appellant and Hansen the location of the monument
shown in Exhibit D-12 \vhich is the northwest corner
of his property (R 1-1-1, 1-16).
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Respondent took appellant and Hansen in his
truck approximately a quarter of a mile south of the
house which is below the monument shown in Exhibit D-12 on a dirt road nearly to the gate shown in
Exhibit D-13. Appellant, Hansen and respondent
walked up the slope east of the gate toward the southwest corner of Mulholland's property and as they
looked up toward the mountain from the Yicinitv of
the gat€ respondent told them his southwest corner
did not go quite to the bottom of Pine Hollow (R 138,
145). Respondent told them that his northwest corner was east of the house shown in Exhibit D-8 and
his southwest corner was east of the gate (R 146).
on the dirt road respondent showed appellant
and Hansen some scarring on the mountain and told
them his west line was a few rods above the scarring
(R 146, 147).

J. Keith Hansen is a party to the option agreement Exhibit P-1. He was with appellant and respondent when respondent showed them the property.
He paid little attention to the detail of the location
of the property (R 74, 75) but testified that they
went down a gravel road leading to some television
tmvers to a gate; that appellant told him the Mulholland property adjoined the state land; that there
was a large gully where the state property starts and
that he understood the Mulholland property adjoined
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the state land on the north (R 74, 75). Mr. Hansen
further testified as follows:

Q. And did you take Mr. Horman up to the
property?
A. Yes, I did.
Q. Did you-where did you go?
A. First we went over by the gate because this
is the only area which I'm familiar with or have any
reliance on the boundaries over by the diggings that
I explained earlier.
Q. Now, has there ever been any question in
your mind, Mr. Hansen, as to whether this property
was located as far as it being as far south as theas just east of the gate that you speak of?
A. Not as to the south boundary.
Q. You've known that that was the south boundary from the beginning?
A. Yes.
Q. And did you know that from what Mr. Mulholland told you?
A. Yes.
Q. And was that what he told you in the presence of Mr. Davis when you were all there together?
A. Yes. (R 78-79).
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Appellant would have this court believe respondent told him his property was 200 to 300 feet
south of the water tanks. Mr. Hansen testified that
such statement was not made in his presence ( R 97).
Respondent denies having made such statement to
appellant or to Mr. Throndsen or to anyone else
(R 149) and testified that his property is a quarter
of a mile south of the water tanks. Mr. Throndsen's
statement that respondent told him his property was
200 to 300 feet south of the water tanks could not
have been relied upon by appellant as it was made
after the second year's option money was paid. Said
statement was denied by respondent.
Appellant would have this court believe that respondent told him the monument which is at the
northwest corner of Section 12 was the southwest
corner of his property. If such were the case the Mulholland property would embrace the water tanks, although appellant admits respondent told him the
property did not include the water tanks ( R 39). If
appellant's statement was true the Mulholland property would include part of two subdivisions (R 116),
Exhibits D-4 and D-5.
Appellant's claim that respondent misrepresented the location of the property or that appellant
was mistaken as to its location is without foundation
by his own admission. He testified that respondent
told him that the property which adjoined his 80 on
the south was state land and that he, Hansen and
respondent "drove around to where there was a gate"
(R 63).
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It would appear that appellant recognized his
undoing in admitting that he was taken down to the
gate for the reason that after a great deal of hedging on other matters he finally admitted that he got
as far south as the gate ( R 64). He tried to explain
the reason for the parties getting as far south as the
gate by saying respondent took them there to show
them a possible access to the property from the state
land (R 167). This is untenable. If access could be
had from state land and the Mulholland property was
1300 to 1400 feet to the north of the state land, as
appellant testified he thought it was, (R 167) he
failed to explain how access could be had over the
property in between. Hansen denied that they went
to the gate for the purpose of being shown where access to the property might be had ( R 82). Respondent
testified they did not go to the gate for the purpose
of determining access to the property ( R 156).

If the property were located where appellant
claims it was pointed out to be, or where he would
have the court believe he thought it was, there would
be no reason for the parties to get as far south as the
gate. But the fact is that they did get as far south as
the gate. The gate is a quarter mile south of the monument which is the northwest corner of the property.
The only reason for going to the gate was to locate
the south boundary and the southwest corner of the
property.
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POINT II
APPELLANT IS PRECLUDED FR 0 M
CLAIMING RESCISSION ON THE GROUND OF
UNILATERAL MISTAKE.
The relief sought by appellant in the second
count of his complaint is for rescission of the contract on the ground of mutual mistake as evidenced
by the following allegations: (Emphasis ours).
In Paragraph 3 respondent "mistakenly represented" the location of the property. In Paragraph 6
"That upon discovering that defendant did not own
the land which both plaintiff and defendant believed
defendant owned ... " In Paragraph 7 "That because of this mutual mistake the defendant is entitled to a rescission of said agreement ... " ( R 3.)
(Emphasis ours).
In the first count of appellant's complaint he
claimed relief on the ground of fraud. The case was
tried on the issues of fraud and mutual mistake. The
court found:
"That prior to the execution of said option
agreement defendant took plaintiff and J.
Keith Hansen out on to the property and
pointed out to them the location thereof."
The court also found:
"That defendant did not intentionally or
mistakenly represent to plaintiff and J. Keith
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Hansen or either of them that the property ... "
is located where appellant claims he thought it
was.
and

"That defendant did not induce plaintiff
or J. Keith Hansen, or either of them, to enter
into said option agreement by making any false
representation to them or othenvise."
(R21).

This court has held that issues raised for the
first time on appeal will be disregarded. Evans vs.
Shand, 74 Utah 451, 280 P. 239; Upton v. Heiselt,
118 Utah 573, 223 P. 2d 428.
In Olson v. Shephard, 165 Minn. 433, a case
cited by appellant on page 15 of his brief, relief on
the basis of unilateral mistake was denied on the
ground that such issue had not been raised in the trial
court. The court said :
"Whether plaintiff's mistake was of a nature to justify a court in cancelling the contract
may be open to question, but, assuming that it
was, he is not entitled to relief upon that ground
on this appeal. This is a court of review, and
its province is to determine whether the questions presented to the trial court for determination were correctly decided by that court. It
has long been settled that, where a party tries
its action on a particular theory, he cannot shift
his ground in this court and assert his right to
recover on a different theory."
The wisdom of the rule is obvious. To hold otherwise would be prejudicial to the other party. This
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court should disregard appellant's claim for relief on
the ground of unilateral mistake.
POINT III
APPELLANT IS ENTITLED TO NO RELIEF FOR UNILATERAL MISTAKE.
The conditions upon which a contract may be
rescinded for unilateral mistake are stated by this
court in Ashworth YS. Charlesworth, 119 Utah 650,
231 P. 2d 724, 727, where the court quoted from an
annotation in 59 A.L.R. 809, as follows:
"Essential conditions to such relief are:
( 1) The mistake must be of so graye a consequence that to enforce the contract as actually
made would be unconscionable. ( 2) The matter
as to which the mistake was made must relate
to a material feature of the contract. (3) Generally the mistake must haYe occurred notwithstanding the exercise of ordinary diligence by
the party making the mistake. ( 4) It must be
possible to giYe relief by way of rescission without serious prejudice to the other party except
the loss of his bargain. In other words, it must be
possible to put him in statu quo."
The effect of negligence on a contract was set
forth in Ashworth Ys. Charlesworth supra in a quotation from \Villiston on Contracts, Section 1596,
reproduced, in part, as fallows:
" . . . But if unilateral mistake, where
there is no fraud or unequitable conduct, is ever
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to be regarded as sufficient ground for the rescission of a bilateral contract, there is more
reason why a court of equity should confine its
jurisdiction to cases where the party seeking
relief has been free from negligence, since the
blame of the situation lies wholly on the party
seeking relief ... "
Relief from unilateral mistake in the contract
price for painting a bridge was denied in the Ashworth case for failure to exercise ordinary diligence
by the party making the mistake. The court said on
page 728:
" ... defendants ... were guilty of such
carelessness in not seeing what they should have
seen and in not obtaining readily available information that the trial court was not obligated
to relieve them from the results of their own
neglect."
The court, in the Ashworth case, observed that
the trial court
"could have reasonably concluded that the
claimed mistake was an afterthought."
Such is also true of the case at bar. Appellant sought
relief in the trial court on the ground of fraud and
mutual mistake. The claim of unilateral mistake is
so much an "afterthought" that it never became an
issue in the pleadings in this case.
If any reason exists for this court to give consideration to appellant's claim of unilateral mistake,
relief should be denied under the doctrine of the Ashworth case. Appellant's mistake, if any there was, is
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a result of his own neglect. Respondent furnished to
appellant and Hansen the correct legal description of
the property. Appellant and Hansen had the option
agreement prepared. The property is correctly
described therein. Respondent used maps to show appellant and Hansen the location of the property. He
took them up on the property and pointed out the location of the corners. He took them on a road to the
west of the property and pointed out the location of
the corners. It is significant that appellant admits
respondent took him as far south as the gate in the
road which is below (west of) the southwest corner
of the property. If appellant thought the south line
of respondent's property was one-fourth of a mile
north of the gate he was negligent in not pursuing
the matter further to learn the true facts. After having been furnished with the correct legal description
and having seen a map showing the property and
having been on the property and having had the corners pointed out to him, if appellant was mistaken
as to its location such is a result of his own neglect.
POINT IV
PROVISION IN THE OPTION AGREEMENT
FOR LIQUIDATED DAMAGES SHOULD BE
UPHELD.
The option agreement contains the following
prov1s10n:
"In the event said option or the renewal
thereof is not exercised, this agreement shall be
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void and of no effect, and both parties shall be
released from all obligations herein, and Seller
shall retain all option payments as liquidated
damages.''
In Perkins v. Spencer, 121 Utah 468, 243 P. 2d
446, a case relied upon by appellant, this court said,
on page 449:
"This court is committed to the doctrine
that where the parties to a contract stipulate
the amount of liquidated damages that shall be
paid in case of a breach, such stipulation is, as
a general rule, enforceable, if the amount stipulated is not disproportionate to the damages actually sustained."
On page 451 the court also said:

"It is true that this (to hold unenforceable

a provision for liquidated damage) should be
done only with great reluctance and when the
facts clearly demonstrate that it would be unconscionable to decree enforcement of the terms
of the contract."
The amount paid on the contract in Perkins vs.
Spencer supra, was a little in excess of 25 percent of
the total purchase price. The court held such was a
penalty. However several cases are cited in Perkins
vs. Spencer in which the provision for liquidated
damages was upheld. Typical is Cooley v. Call, 61
Utah 203, 211 P. 977, in which the amount paid was
approximately 10 percent of the purchase price.
The total purchase price in the option in the case
at bar is $95,000.00. Appellant and Hansen were
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granted an exclusive option to purchase the property of respondent for one year for $5,000.00 and
were granted the right to extend the option for an
additional year for the sum of $5,000.00. Appellant
paid $2,500.00 for each of the two years. Respondent
was prevented from making any sale or disposition
of his property for a period of two years in consideration of the amount paid for the option. The facts
of this case, rather than suggesting "unconscionable
award or exorbitant recovery" as claimed by appellant, require application of the general rule as stated
in the case of Perkins vs. Spencer quoted above of
upholding the provision in the contract for liquidated
damages.
POINT V
THE TRIAL COURT WAS IMPARTIAL IN
THE CONDUCT OF THE TRIAL.
Rulings of the trial court against the appellant
on the admissibility of evidence have been cited by
appellant in support of his claim that the court was
not impartial. If such is a basis of showing partiality,
there are a number of instances in which the court
ruled against respondent on admissibility of evidence
as follows:
The court permitted appellant to testify to a
conversation between appellant and respondent and
a Mr. Throndsen which occurred some fifteen
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months after the option agreement was signed in
which appellant stated that respondent pointed out
to him and Mr. Throndsen the location of the property. (R 48, 49). The same thing occurred with respect to the deposition of Mr. Throndsen (R 102,
103) . Other rulings on admission of evidence against
respondent occurred as reported in the record on
pages 107, 121, 145 and 151. The complete record is
before this court. There is nothing therein in di ca ting
partiality of the trial court.
CONCLUSION
The trial court found that respondent did not
intentionally or mistakenly misrepresent the location
of the property. With respect to relief claimed in law
such finding must stand on appeal if it is supported
by competent evidence. With respect to relief
claimed in equity such finding will not be set aside
unless it is clearly against the weight of the evidence.
It has been abundantly shown that such finding is
not only supported by competent evidence but by the
weight of the evidence.
Misrepresentation having been eliminated by
such finding, appellant's claim of fraud must fail.
Said finding also eliminates mistake on the part
of respondent. Therefore appellant's claim for rescission on the ground of mutual mistake must fail.

It would appear from examination of appellant's
brief that he has abandoned his claim for rescission
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for mutual mistake and seeks relief in this court on
the basis of unilateral mistake. With respect to unilateral mistake it has been pointed out:
1. That appellant is precluded from urging unilateral mistake in this appeal.
2. That the claim of unilateral mistake is an
"afterthought" for the reason that it never
became an issue in the pleadings.
3. That appellant is entitled to no relief for unilateral mistake because of his own neglect.
It has been shown that the provision in the option agreement for liquidated damages should be
upheld and that the trial court was impartial in its
conduct of the trial.

Respondent respectfully urges this court to affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Respectfully submitted,
HAROLD R. BOYER
of Romney & Boyer

Attorneys for Respondent

1409 Walker Bank Bldg.
Salt Lake City, Utah

